In criminal law, the right to a speedy trial is a human right under which it is asserted that a government prosecutor may not delay the trial of a criminal suspect arbitrarily and indefinitely. Otherwise, the power to impose such delays would effectively allow prosecutors to send anyone to jail for an arbitrary length of time...however, when the judge acts with a prosecutor and intentionly delays it by denying your right to keep, as well as dismiss counsel, well, lets just say the "assistance of counsel" is nothing but another lie.

The Founding Fathers intended the Speedy Trial Clause to serve two purposes. First, they sought to prevent defendants from languishing in jail for an indefinite period before trial. Pre-trial incarceration is a deprivation of liberty no less serious than post-conviction imprisonment. In some cases pretrial incarceration may be more serious because public scrutiny is often heightened, employment is commonly interrupted, financial resources are diminished, family relations are strained, and innocent persons are forced to suffer prolonged injury to reputation.

Second, the Founding Fathers sought to ensure a defendant's right to a fair trial. The longer the commencement of trial is postponed, the more likely it is that witnesses will disappear, memories will fade, and evidence will be lost or destroyed.

Of course, both the prosecution and the defense are "threatened" by these dangers, but only the defendant's life, liberty, and property are at stake in a criminal proceeding.

A delay of at least one year in bringing a defendant to trial following arrest will trigger a presumption that the Sixth Amendment has been violated, with the level of judicial scrutiny increasing in direct proportion to the length of delay.

A longer delay may be deemed constitutional, however, and a shorter delay may be deemed unconstitutional, depending on the circumstances.

Longer delays will be permitted to accommodate the schedules of important witnesses, and to allow the prosecution to prepare for a complex case.

Longer delays will also be tolerated when a defendant is dilatory in asserting the right to a speedy trial.

In general, defendants must assert their Sixth Amendment right in a timely motion before the trial court. If the defendant fails to assert the right in this manner or acquiesces in the face of protracted pretrial delays, she or he may not raise the issue for the first time on appeal, unless the defendant's failure to raise the issue earlier was due to her or his attorney's Negligence. Defendants who delay prosecution by inundating the trial court with frivolous pretrial motions are also treated as having forfeited their rights to a speedy trial.

KILLERCOP: Another one? Another one? When does it stop? When does it stop?

THE COURT: Now let me try to answer that question. It stops when you proceed to trial, if that is what you choose to do. And you subject the government to the burden of proving you guilty. One thing I can tell you, Mr. Killercop, is that the first thing you asked for when I gave you the opportunity to address me this morning, you will get. That's a fair trial.

KILLERCOP: No.

THE COURT:, I don't expect you to agree with me but that's what you will get. Now let me explain something to you. You do not have a legal right, you have not established a legal basis and there is no legal basis to have these charges thrown out at this stage."

Section 3161(h)(7) excludes delays resulting from a continuance when the court finds that the "ends of justice served by taking [that] action outweigh the . . . interest of the public and the defendant in a speedy trial." The factors, among others, that a court must consider in deciding whether to grant a continuance under this section are:

(i) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in the proceeding would be likely to make a continuation of such proceeding impossible, or result in a miscarriage of justice.

(ii) Whether the case is so unusual or so complex, due to the number of defendants, the nature of the prosecution, or the existence of novel questions of fact or law, that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation for pretrial proceedings or for the trial itself within the time limits established by this section.
. . . .
(iv) Whether the failure to grant such a continuance in a case which, taken as a whole, is not so unusual or so complex as to fall within clause (ii),
would deny the defendant reasonable time to obtain counsel, would unreasonably deny the defendant or the Government continuity of counsel, or would deny counsel for the defendant or the attorney for the Government the reasonable time necessary for effective preparation, taking into account the exercise of
due diligence.

FACTS:

We have held that the filing of a superseding indictment will not automatically reset the STA clock where the new indictment does not charge a new crime, but only corrects a defect in the original indictment. See United States v. Karsseboom, 881 F.2d 604, 607 (9th Cir.1989); United States v. Clymer, 25 F.3d 824 (9th Cir.1994). In Clymer, we stated that "[although the grand jury returned a superseding indictment on April 28, 1989, this action did not restart the Speedy Trial Act clock. When a superseding indictment contains charges which, under double-jeopardy principles, are required to be joined with the original charges, Speedy Trial Act calculations begin from the date of the original indictment." 25 F.3d at 827 n. 2 (emphasis in original). This rule "prevents the government from circumventing the speedy trial guarantee by restarting the speedy-trial clock by obtaining superseding indictments with minor corrections." United States v. Gonzales, 897 F.2d 1312, 1316 (5th Cir.1990).

"Only one tribunal ever adopted a practice of forcing counsel upon an unwilling defendant in a criminal proceeding. The tribunal was the Star Chamber."-U.S. v Faretta , 422 U.S. 806 (1975)

OUTSIDE, IT'S AMERICA

REASONABLE DOUBT

"Silence in the face of evil is itself evil: God will not hold us guiltless.
Not to speak is to speak. Not to act is to act." ― Dietrich Bonhoeffer

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All Rights Reserved

Here in 2022 they are still lying to the American people.

Example: "Furthermore, at least some of the delay occurred due to Marquez's request for a continuance and his own behavior, which caused one of his court-appointed attorneys to withdraw before trial. See United States v. Sutcliffe, 505 F.3d 944, 957 (9th Cir. 2007)(finding third Barker factor weighed against the defendant because he “sabotage[d] his relationship with each appointed attorney, necessitating the delays”); United States v. Tanh Huu Lam, 251 F.3d 852, 859 (9th Cir. 2001)

"We review a speedy trial claim de novo and review the district court's factual findings for clear error." ~US v. Arceo, 2008

Speedy Trial... Not! In the Interests of Justice, of course.

A.K.A. The case of Slow The Roll! We need another year of your time. A.K.A. He is "obligated," so take "a long time out." A.K.A. The[ Due] Process is the punishment.

Arrest date: 03/26/2002

State: New Hampshire. By FBI

Transferred by ConAir to California.

Assigned a public pretender and a few entitlements to rummage through and over.

Deemed a "Complex" Case by judge A. Howard Matz

5/16/02, Docket 23:
Stipulation And Order: Exclude Time: Trial continued to 9/3/02.

This Stipulation And Order: Exclude Time was done by the Public Defender's Office of California without the consent, knowledge or "agreement" of Killercop, by Judge Matz specifically designating the case as "complex."

On 8/22/02, Docket 36:
Status Conference: Case is continued to 10/22/02  [No Time Waived]

On 9/4/02, Docket 38:
Stipulation Post Continuance: “parties agree” time should be excluded through and including 10/22/02. This was done by the Public Defender's Office, again, without the consent, knowledge or "agreement" of Killercop.

THE FOLLOWING INTENTIONAL DELAY CAUSED BY THE [FPD] OFFICE AND JUDGE A. HOWARD MATZ TAKES PLACE ON 09.23.2002 BETWEEN THE HOURS OF 4:08 AND 4:57 PM (PST)

On 11/27/02, Docket 68:
Stipulation and Order to Exclude Time filed by Judge. Period from 11/26/02 to 1/14/03 pursuant to 18: 3161without the consent, knowledge or "agreement" (Note: Speedy Trial Act is subject to Bill of Rights Speedy Trial and Due Process Clauses.)

On 12/4/02, Docket 71: Killercop's Motion to Dismiss For Denial Of Speedy Trial. 

It should be noted that the Judge personally set this date of December 3rd, 2022 (12/2002) back on September 23, 2002, page 28, lines 7-8 and page 31, Lines 7-8, specifically requesting and "requiring" December 3rd, 2002.

No Order to Exclude Time filed by this Judge should have counted, under any rules, against the accused.

A.K.A. The Ol' "Overcrowded" Excuse, Used To Delay And Deny And Usurp Rights. Fun For The Whole Family! He Must Be So Proud.

(RT, 12/4/02) Page 19, Lines 6
Judge Matz: “And the problem is I'm going to be in trial.  So I think you need to consult with Killercop and with my court clerk, and see what dates are available to you and the persecution.”

Actually the problem is I am rotting in prison, without rights he swore to protect.

“Overcrowded courts should be weighed less heavily (then government's deliberate attempt to delay).” Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972)(cite omitted).

12/04/02, Docket 73:
Minutes of Motion Hearing. Court Denies Motion To Dismiss For Denial Of Speedy Trial.

On 12/18/02, Docket 78:
Court receives personal letter from Defendant and Orders Defendant not to communicate directly with court.  Judge Later rescinds this unlawful and illegal Order. See Docket 79.

1/3/03, Docket 80: Judge sets a “firm date” for trial of 1/14/03.

1/10/03, Docket 104:
Denies Killercop's motion to continue trial. Grants motion to continue arraignment on "newly filed 'Superceding' Indictment."

1/14/03, Docket 110:
Defendant files Writ of Mandamus to Dismiss for Violations of 5th and 6th Amendment of the Bill of the Rights.
1/14/03,

Docket 113: Court continues trial to 3/25/03

1/17/03, Docket 114:
Court files Competency Motion; this Competency Motion pursuant to 18: § 4141(sic), is thereafter “PLACED IN FILE - - NOT USED.” 

It subsequently “disappeared” from the court's files. I kept a vital copy.

1/17/03, Docket 118:
Court "adopts" Speedy Trial Act recitals contained in “Proposed [Competency] Order.”

1/21/03, Docket 115:
Order Re Excludable Time filed by judge. Period between 1/14/03 and 3/25/03 are deemed excludable pursuant to 18: §3161(h)(1)(A).

3/14/03, Docket 139:
Court denies Defendants 2241 Motion to recuse judge A. Howard Matz.. Judge A. Howard Matz. orders defendant removed from hearing. Court vacates 3/25/03 trial date. Trial set for 9/9/03.  Orders Defendant shipped off for mental “treatment” under auspices of “evaluation.” 

NOTE: On 3/20/03, judge admits he illegally denied Defendants 2241 Motion on 3/14/03

ONE WHOLE YEAR HAS NOW PASSED

]EVERYTHING THE COURT DID AFTER THE ILLEGAL DENIAL WAS BOTH ILLEGAL AND UNLAWFUL.  SEE Docket 146 & 147, 156.

3/27/03, Docket 150:
Foisted Counsel Greg Nicolaysen, files an Order for a computer EXPERT, two days after trial was scheduled to begin on 3/25/03

4/7/03, Docket 157:
Court hold secret hearing without Killercop present. Court files Amended Order Re Determination of Killercop's Competency.

Competency Hearing set for 8/25/03, trial to remain 9/9/03.

8/27/03, Docket 188:
Court finds [Illegally] that Defendant waived counsel and Orders him to proceed in Pro Se. Foists Standby Counsel, then court and Foisted Standby Counsel confer regarding the trial date and Government's Speedy Trial Act calculations.

On Government's own motion trial is continued from 9/9/03 until 9/30/03.  Court notes Defendant specifically did not agree to continuation.

Standby Counsel then “quits” due to schedule conflict on 9/2/03. 

New Standby Counsel appointed.

Killercop is blamed for counsel quiting, later at his appeal.

9/24/03, Docket 224:
Government files special request that court “adopt” Standby Counsel to  “Represent” Defendant as Trial Counsel.  

Defendant objects at hearing held 9/26/03, Docket 236.

9/25/03, Docket 225:
Government files Speedy Trial Memorandum:

9/26/03, Docket 236:
Court continues trial until 10/7/03. Orders government to “promptly” file detailed briefing regards Speedy Trial Act calculations regards several issues including whether the court could “stop the clock” by "starting a trial on paper, then continuing it until a later time." In other words, play God and manipulate time itself.

10/1/03, Docket 238:
Government files calculations regarding Speedy Trial Act. But not the Speedy Trial Right.

10/1/03, Docket 242:
Court continues 10/7/03 trial date “to a date to be determined later” and notes that continuation is without Killercop's explicit consent.

10/7/03, Docket 246:
Court relieves Counsel and reappoints him as Standby Counsel after "deeming" Killercop, again, waived right to assistance of counsel.  On court's own motion continues trial until 11/12/03 [or 1/6/04].  Excludes time under 3161(h)(8). Matz later admits no authority and calls all of this a "technical error."

The F.B.I. called this a mistake.

So Judge Matz gets his buddy to dust bin the facts, so he can get away with breaking the law.

And conspiring with others to break the law.

And again the F.B.I. turns their back on the facts.

Maybe they are too busy making Power Point Presentations? Or standing laughing at police torturing another Citizen.

A FACT:

They uses rules to trump rights. Then call these violations of rights "mistakes" and "technical errors." And lift not a finger to ease the burden. The rules mean nothing.

I GOT A FINGER , TOO!

SO WOE UNTO THEE

Suspicion that viewpoint discrimination is afoot is at its zenith when the speech restricted is speech critical of the government," Ridley v. Mass. Bay Transp. Auth., 390 F.3d 65, 86 (1st Cir. 2004)

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